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THE DECLINE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
IN NEW YORK 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK  
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
People v. Encarnacion1 
(decided June 23, 2011) 
 
A jury convicted Samuel Encarnacion of second-degree mur-
der, attempted murder, and assault and sentenced him to twenty years 
to life.2  Encarnacion appealed the trial court‟s decision, claiming his 
constitutional right to confront a witness under the Sixth Amend-
ment3 was violated through the prosecution‟s use of a grand jury tes-
timony in its case-in-chief from a witness who refused to testify at 
trial.4  Additionally, he alleged that the testimony of a DNA analyst, 
who did not personally conduct the DNA tests in which she was testi-
fying to, violated his right to confront a witness.5  The Appellate Di-
vision, First Department, affirmed the lower court finding that the de-
fendant‟s misconduct “induced [the witness‟s] refusal to testify at 
trial”6 and that the DNA results are “non-identifying raw data” that 
“shed no light on the guilt of the accused.”7 
 
1 926 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2011). 
2 Id. at 457. 
3 The Supreme Court makes the “[Sixth Amendment] obligatory upon the States.”  Illinois 
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)). 
4 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 451. 
5 Id. at 454. 
6 Id. at 453. 
7 Id. (citing People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. 2009)).  In the alternative, the 
First Department held that if an error were made in admitting the testimony of the witness or 
the testimony of the DNA analyst, then such an error would nevertheless be harmless due to 
the weight of the evidence.  Id. at 454. 
1
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I. FACTS 
On January 20, 2005, police responded to a 911 call at an 
apartment building in Bronx, New York.8  In the lobby, police met 
with Encarnacion and were directed to apartment 8J.9  In the apart-
ment, police discovered Ofelia Torres, Encarnacion‟s girlfriend, on 
the floor of the apartment with numerous stab wounds.10  The police 
also discovered Ofelia‟s cousin, Johnny Torres, dead on the floor 
with numerous stab wounds.11  In the compactor room of the apart-
ment building, police discovered a garbage bag filled with “a pair of 
sweat pants, a white t-shirt, a pair of jeans, and a pair of sneakers.”12  
In addition to the clothing in the bag, police also found bloody 
knives.13  The bag found was similar to other bags found in Encarna-
cion‟s apartment building.14  A doctor later asked Ofelia who her at-
tacker was, and Ofelia verbally responded that it was Encarnacion.15 
Before Ofelia could testify at trial, she had stopped cooperat-
ing with the prosecution and refused to testify against Encarnacion.16  
The prosecution informed the court that it intended to use Ofelia‟s 
grand jury testimony against the defendant.17  The trial court then 
held a Sirois18 hearing to determine if Encarnacion‟s misconduct 
caused Ofelia‟s refusal to cooperate.19 
At the Sirois hearing, Ofelia‟s mother, Nancy Torres, testified 
that after the crime occurred, Encarnacion began to call Ofelia both at 
Nancy‟s home and on Ofelia‟s cell phone.20  The number of calls to 
Nancy‟s home was in excess of 1,000 times.21  She also testified to 
 





13 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 450. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 453. 
17 Id. 
18 At a Sirois hearing, before an out of court statement is allowed in a case-in-chief, the 
trial court must determine if the prosecution has shown “the defendant‟s misconduct by clear 
and convincing evidence” induced a witness not to testify against the defendant.  Encarna-
cion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53. 
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the content of one of these telephone calls, in which she overheard 
Ofelia and Encarnacion discuss how to change Ofelia‟s testimony so 
Encarnacion would receive less time in prison.22  After the conversa-
tion that Nancy described, the prosecution noted that Ofelia‟s testi-
mony had changed from the one she gave to the grand jury.23  Now 
she accused Johnny of stabbing her.24  Upon Ofelia being hospita-
lized, she changed her story back to that of the grand jury testimony 
and admitted the defendant told her to lie.25 
Nancy further testified that Ofelia told her that Encarnacion 
was the one who told her to change the story so he would get out of 
jail quicker.26  Next, Ofelia told Nancy that her reasoning for refusing 
to cooperate was because Encarnacion, “through his friends,” told 
Ofelia that if she “comes in [to testify] he would get her.”27 
At the conclusion of the Sirois hearing, the trial court then 
permitted the prosecution to use grand jury testimony of Ofelia in its 
case-in-chief, holding that Encarnacion‟s improper influence on Ofe-
lia caused her refusal to testify.28  On appeal, Encarnacion argued that 
the prosecution violated his constitutional right to confront a witness 
against him because the prosecution had not sufficiently proven that 
his misconduct had caused the witness‟s unavailability at trial.29  The 
First Department upheld the trial court‟s holding, concluding, “clear-
ly and convincingly,” that the evidence had shown that Encarnacion, 
through fear, had caused the witness‟s refusal to testify.30 
At trial, “the prosecution offered testimony from Danielle 
Coye, a forensic scientist employed by the Office of the Chief Medi-
cal Examiner[,] . . . [who] personally performed the DNA testing on 
all . . . [the] items from the crime scene . . . [w]ith the exception of a 
pair of jeans, sneakers and socks.”31  She testified from her notes and 
the exhibits in evidence regarding not only the tests she personally 
 
22 Id. 




27 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 453. 
29 Id. at 451. 
30 Id. at 454. 
31 Id. at 456. 
3
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performed, but also from tests she had not performed.32 
A. First Department’s Analysis of the Sirois Hearing 
The court began its analysis by discussing the differences be-
tween the state and federal approach to defining misconduct.33  The 
court emphasized New York‟s broader definition of misconduct over 
its federal counterpart, stating that New York‟s definition of miscon-
duct includes “intimidation[,] . . . bribery, threats, and the use of a re-
lationship to improperly procure a witness‟s silence.”34 
Next, the court looked at Nancy‟s testimony from the Sirois 
hearing, focusing specifically on the portion in which she testified 
that “Ofelia told her [that Encarnacion] through his friends, told Ofe-
lia that if she comes in, [he] would get her.”35  The court noted that 
this statement implicitly showed that Encarnacion had threatened 
Ofelia and caused her silence.36  From this, the court stated that be-
cause Encarnacion caused Ofelia‟s refusal to testify, he had lost his 
right to confront her, and therefore, the use of her grand jury minutes 
against him were proper.37  Finally, regarding the evidence standard 
of the Sirois evidence, the court held that clearly and convincingly it 
had been shown that Encarnacion through his threats had caused the 
witness fear that prevented her from testifying.38 
 
32 Id. 
33 See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (comparing the federal approach to the state‟s 
approach on defining misconduct). 
34 Id. (citations omitted) (citing People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1999)). 
35 Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 458.  In disagreement, the concurring opinion wrote: 
Even putting aside that on cross-examination [Nancy] repeatedly stated 
that her daughter had told her that an alleged friend, not friends, of de-
fendant had made such a statement, this seems too slender a reed to sup-
port the conclusion that the People proved defendant‟s responsibility for 
such a threat by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 459 (McGuire, J., concurring). 
  Moreover, the concurring opinion did not agree that there was even a threat made.  See 
id. at 458 (“To repeat, there is no credible evidence that defendant knew about, condoned or 
encouraged the alleged threat.”).  The concurring opinion stated that Nancy‟s testimony was 
an “in-court statement . . . [made] about an out-of-court statement her daughter assertedly 
made about an out-of-court statement assertedly made by unidentified persons about an out-
of-court statement assertedly made by defendant.”  Id. at 459.  From this, the concurring 
opinion stated, “Any conclusion that this is competent evidence would be at least a contro-
4
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II. FEDERAL COURTS’ APPROACH TO WAIVER OF THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT’S RIGHTS 
The Supreme Court case of Illinois v. Allen39 provides the 
guidelines regarding waiver of a defendant‟s confrontation rights.40  
There, the Supreme Court held that a defendant through misconduct 
could lose his right to be present at trial.41  In Allen, the defendant, 
repeatedly and after numerous warnings from the trial judge, contin-
ued to act in an abusive and disrespectful manner that interfered with 
his trial.42  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 
to consider whether there was a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause.43 
The Court refused to make the Confrontation Clause absolute 
where there is “flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary 
standards of proper conduct.”44  The Court also quoted Justice Cardo-
zo: “No doubt the privilege of [personally confronting witnesses] 
may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.”45  In direct 
disagreement with the Seventh Circuit, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment‟s Confrontation Clause is not absolute, and as such, it 
can be lost by a defendant‟s misconduct.46 
The Second Circuit in United States v. Mastrangelo,47 ex-
panded on the misconduct exception to the Confrontation Clause by 
 
versial one.”  Id.  Furthermore, the concurring opinion notes that the majority did not cite to 
any “precedent supporting its implicit position that such an extended chain of out-of-court 
statements by unidentified persons is not only competent evidence but evidence that can play 
a decisive role in satisfying the prosecution‟s burden to prove its case by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.”  Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 459. 
39 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
40 See id. at 346-47 (holding that the trial judge did not commit any legal error removing 
the defendant from his own trial); see also Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97, 121-22 
(1934) (holding that a defendant did not have a right to visit the scene of the crime with the 
jury); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458-59 (1912) (holding that the defendant waived 
his right to be present at trial when he consented for the trial to proceed without him). 
41 Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43. 
42 Id. at 339-41.  The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the defendant by his conduct had 
“relinquished his constitutional right to be present.”  Id. at 341. 
43 Id. at 338. 
44 Id. at 343. 
45 Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934), 
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)). 
46 See id. (holding “that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial” through his 
misconduct). 
47 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982). 
5
Fasano: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
934 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
including waiver of a defendant‟s right to confront a witness if the 
defendant uses chicanery,48 threats,49 murder, or violence to procure a 
witness‟s silence.50  In Mastrangelo, the purchase of four trucks 
linked the defendant to the crime, with only one witness of that pur-
chase.51  At grand jury, the witness testified that he sold the trucks to 
the defendant.52  Parts of a recorded conversation between the witness 
and defendant could reasonably be understood as threats to prevent 
the witness from testifying against the person who purchased the 
trucks.53  On the day the witness was to testify at trial, two men shot 
him.54  After a mistrial, the prosecution sought to introduce the wit-
ness‟s prior grand jury testimony, which the trial court allowed.55 
The Second Circuit affirmed the use of the prior grand jury 
testimony, stating that if the defendant had played a part in the wit-
ness‟s refusal to testify, he would have waived any confrontation 
clause objections against the admittance of the witness‟s testimony.56  
The court further stated that a person, in both criminal and civil trials, 
cannot take advantage of a wrong he has committed.57 
Next, the court had to determine the appropriate burden of 
proof for waiver hearings in a federal court.58  The court stated the 
prosecution has the burden; however, it was unclear on the appropri-
ate burden.59  While the court in United States v. Balano60 used a 
“preponderance of the evidence” test, the court in United States v. 
Thevis61 applied a higher standard of “clear and convincing.”62  The 
Second Circuit held that the burden of proof in a waiver hearing 
 
48 Id. at 272-73 (citing United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1975)). 
49 Id. (citing United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979)). 
50 Id. (citing United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
51 Id. at 271. 
52 Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 271-72. 
56 Id. at 272. 
57 Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271 (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 
(1912)). 
58 See id. at 273. 
59 Id. 
60 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979). 
61 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982). 
62 See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (comparing the evidentiary standard set out in Bala-
no, to the standard set out in Thevis). 
6
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where there is misconduct would be “by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”63  The court in its reasoning, noted that there is a difference 
between the Confrontation Clause and waiver by misconduct, thereby 
allowing different burdens of proof.64  Consequently, the lower evi-
dentiary standard of preponderance of the evidence satisfied the 
court.65 
Having established the burden of proof, the court remanded 
the case to the district court to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, if the defendant was involved in the witness‟s murder.66  If 
so, he waived his rights under the Confrontation Clause.67  In addi-
tion, the court stated, “Bare knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness] 
and a failure to give warning to appropriate authorities is sufficient to 
constitute a waiver.”68 
III. NEW YORK’S HOLLOW HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY 
STANDARD FOR WAIVER HEARINGS 
The New York State Court of Appeals defined misconduct 
more broadly than its federal counterpart,69 and it began with an ex-
pressly higher standard on its Confrontation Clause waiver hear-
ings.70  The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Geraci,71 ex-
tended the definition of misconduct in New York to include 
intimidation and bribery72 and required the evidence at a waiver hear-
ing to be “clear and convincing,” which affords a greater protection 
to the defendant than in federal court.73  The court held that grand 





66 Id. at 273-74 
67 Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74. 
68 Id. 
69 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 452. 
70 Compare Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (setting out a preponderance of the evidence 
standard), with People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995) (setting out a clear and 
convincing standard for the state of New York). 
71 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995). 
72 Id. at 824. 
73 Compare Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (setting out a preponderance of the evidence 
standard), with Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 822 (setting out a clear and convincing standard for 
the state of New York). 
7
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shown that the defendant induced the witness‟s unavailability.74 
In Geraci, a witness‟s grand jury testimony supplied the main 
evidence in an indictment of the defendant.75  After the witness‟s 
grand jury testimony, but before trial, the witness abruptly left his job 
and family to move out of state.76  The prosecution then learned that 
the witness no longer wished to testify and sought a Sirois hearing to 
use the witness‟s grand jury testimony against the defendant at trial.77 
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision, stating 
that a factfinder could clearly and convincingly conclude from the 
evidence and the inferences drawn from that evidence that the defen-
dant had played a part in the witness‟s unavailability.78  Further not-
ing, that the conclusions reached by the trial court rested on “concrete 
facts.”79 
In support of its holding that the clear and convincing stan-
dard had been met, the court noted first that there was evidence 
showing the motive and opportunity of the defendant.80  Specifically, 
the defendant being out on bail for months prior to trial gave him op-
portunity to intimidate the witness.81  Furthermore, a fact finder could 
conclude from the evidence before it that there was a strong motive 
for the defendant to cause the witness not to testify.82  The evidence 
supported the inference that the defendant was aware of the witness‟s 
value to the prosecution and the witness‟s lack of cooperation with 
 
74 Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 821. 
75 Id. at 819. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  At the hearing, two police investigators testified that the defendant had made con-
tact with the witness, seeking to have him come speak to the defendant‟s lawyer.  Id.  The 
investigators also revealed that the witness called them from Florida to tell them that he was 
aware that the defendant had a copy of his testimony, and the witness expressed fear not only 
for himself, but also for his family because if he testified he would end up in trouble.  Gera-
ci, 649 N.E.2d at 819.  The investigators also stated that the witness told them that a friend of 
the witness had stopped people coming to break the witness‟s legs.  Id.  Additionally, the 
investigators testified that the witness was now receiving money from the defendant‟s uncle 
after an unidentified friend of the witness had spoken with the uncle.  Id. at 819-20.  After 
this attempted bribery is when investigators realized that the witness had altered his original 
testimony, and now claims he never saw the stabbing.  Id.  The trial court allowed the grand 
jury testimony in place of the witness‟s live testimony.  Id. at 820. 
78 Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 824. 
79 Id. 
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the defense.83 
Second, the court noted that there was evidence that an un-
known person confronted the witness and that he showed a copy of 
the witness‟s accusation against the defendant.84  Third, the witness‟s 
actual statements to the investigators showed that his intimidation 
was attributed to the defendant.85  The statements by the witness to 
the investigators logically showed that the defendant caused the wit-
ness‟s fear.86  Those statements also showed the “fear and resent-
ment” that the witness felt against the defendant.87  Lastly, the defen-
dant‟s likelihood of involvement was dramatically multiplied when 
the witness at the hearing testified that the defendant‟s uncle had of-
fered him more than $10,000 to remain silent.88  It was this financial 
arrangement that the court noted, “directly benefitted” the defendant, 
and therefore, it was a reason to find that the defendant had used in-
timidation or bribery in procuring the witness‟s silence.89 
The New York Court of Appeals seemingly hollowed out the 
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing for a Sirois hearing 
when it decided People v. Cotto.90  In Cotto, the prosecution‟s key 
witness, who was going to identify the defendant as the shooter, un-
expectedly phoned the prosecutor and refused to testify at trial due to 
fear for himself and his family.91  The prosecution then noted that the 
witness informed them that his life might be in jeopardy after several 
men approached him and his family.92 
Subsequently, the court ordered a Sirois hearing to determine 
if the defendant through intimidation had induced the witness not to 
testify.93  An officer testified at the hearing that the witness‟s fiancé 
was fearful for her and her child, after a man asked the witness‟s 
 





88 Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 823-24. 
89 Id. at 824. 
90 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998); see also Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 233 (2d Cir. 
2003) (regarding Cotto, 699 N.E.2d 394, the Second Circuit on habeas corpus appeal stated 
that a de novo review of the case may lead to find that the evidence “was insufficient to per-
mit the admission of the out-of-court statements”). 
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mother and sister about the witness‟s whereabouts.94  In addition, a 
detective testified at the hearing that the witness‟s sister said several 
unidentified people had asked her about the witness‟s specific whe-
reabouts in jail.95  The sister also told the detective that there was 
“word on the street” that her brother had talked.96  The mother of the 
witness also testified, which corroborated the sister‟s testimony.97  
The trial court held that the prosecution had shown, by a clear and 
convincing standard, the use of misconduct to induce a witness‟s si-
lence.98 
The Court of Appeals, in agreement with the trial court, held 
that sufficient evidence existed to show that the threats against the 
witness had scared him into silence.99  In its reasoning, the court 
noted that the testimony of the two police officers regarding the out 
of court statements made by the witness, as well as the interviews of 
the witness‟s sister and mother, showed the witness had been ready to 
identify the defendant but was now scared into not testifying.100  Even 
though the witness denied that threats were ever made against him, 
the court ruled in favor of the police officers in this credibility 
clash.101  For this, the court looked at the trial court judge‟s observa-
tion that the witness at the Sirois hearing “appeared to be anxious, 
uncomfortable and forced in his responses, a demeanor inconsistent 
with truthfulness and consistent with a state of mind demonstrating 
fear of harm to his family or to himself if he should testify against 
[the defendant].”102 
The court also held that the evidence sufficiently linked the 
threats to the defendant.103  First, the defendant knew the witness 
from his small neighborhood.104  Additionally, at the time of the 
threats, the defendant was out on bail and had the ability to make the 
 
94 Id. at 397. 
95 Id. 
96 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 397. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 398.  But see id. at 404 (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding that the evidence from 
the Sirois hearing of “unnamed individuals” who allegedly approached the witness‟s family, 
along with “word on the street,” did not meet the clear and convincing standard). 
100 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398 (majority opinion). 
101 Id. 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 27
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/27
  
2012] CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 939 
threats.105  Moreover, the timing of the threats was important to the 
court‟s analysis as well, because immediately after it was revealed 
that the witness could implicate the defendant, the witness began to 
receive the threats.106  This gave the “defendant uniquely good reason 
to want to intimidate [the witness]—and there was no suggestion that 
anyone else stood to gain from the witness‟s silence.”107  Lastly, the 
court noted that the defendant, at the time of the shooting, had pre-
viously threatened the witness when he pointed his gun at the wit-
ness.108  The court concluded that the prosecution had met the clear 
and convincing standard, and therefore, it could use the witness‟s out 
of court statements against the defendant.109 
IV. COMPARISON 
The Appellate Division, First Department, in Encarnacion 
appears to have further lowered the evidentiary standard required in 
Sirois hearings, in its department.  It did this in a case where it was 
not even necessary to decide the issue of whether the evidence met 
the burden.110  Accordingly, the evidence in Encarnacion does not 
even rise to the reduced levels of clear and convincing that Cotto re-
quired.111 
The court in Encarnacion relied heavily on the testimony of a 
biased mother, whose daughter was a victim of a heinous crime.112  
 
105 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398. 
106 See id. (stating that the threats began when it was revealed to the defendant that the 
witness could implicate him). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  The dissent disagrees with the majority‟s holding that the evidence links the defen-
dant to the witness‟s unavailability.  Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 404 (Smith, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent stated: 
There is no proof that a “contract” existed on the witness.  There is no 
proof that the defendant or anyone acting on his behalf ever spoke to the 
witness‟s sister.  Although defendant was out on bail, there is no proof 
that he or anyone associated with him made any contact with the wit-
ness. 
Id. 
110 See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 457 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that the ma-
jority knows it does not have to resolve this issue but does so nonetheless). 
111 See id. at 458 (“[T]here is no credible evidence that defendant knew about, condoned 
or encouraged the alleged threat.”). 
112 See id. at 454 (majority opinion) (using only Nancy‟s testimony to describe how the 
11
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This differs drastically from what the courts in Geraci and Cotto re-
lied on in making their decisions.  In Geraci, the court relied primari-
ly on the testimony of police and the actual witness in reaching its 
holding.113  In that case, the investigators‟ meetings with the witness 
and witness‟s actual testimony revealed that the defendant had come 
in contact with the witness and that the defendant‟s uncle was paying 
off the witness.114  In Cotto, the court took the word of the police over 
the other witnesses in the Sirois hearing, finding credibility issues 
with the witness‟s family.115  However, in Encarnacion, the key tes-
timony provided at the hearing was that of the victim‟s own moth-
er.116  Foregoing the obvious bias a mother would have against the 
man she believed conducted a vicious and savage crime against her 
daughter, and that Nancy contradicted her own testimony,117 the only 
other witness at the hearing was a detective who testified that Ofelia 
told him that she was still in love with the defendant, she refused to 
testify against him, and that she hopes he “gets out.”118 
The alleged 1,000 phone calls from the defendant to the wit-
ness and the phone conversation between them does not provide 
enough evidence, either on its own or combined with other evidence, 
to rise to the level of clear and convincing.119  In Geraci, the court 
found actual evidence of misconduct in the payment of the witness,120 
which differs strongly from merely finding a large number of phone 
calls from the defendant to the witness.  In Cotto, the court saw that 
 
clear and convincing burden was met). 
113 See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 819 (noting only the testimony of two investigators and the 
witness as testifying at the Sirois hearing). 
114 Id. at 819-820 (making reference to a meeting between an investigator and witness 
about a friend who had come in contact with the defendant‟s uncle). 
115 See Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398 (noting a “credibility clash” between the police and wit-
ness‟s family that was resolved in favor of the police by the trial judge). 
116 See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that only two 
witnesses actually testified at the Sirois hearing, while the police officer‟s testimony pro-
vided “little if anything”). 
117 See id. (noting that Nancy on cross, stated “that the defendant had never threatened 
[Ofelia],” and “testified that Ofelia had said that a friend, not friends, of defendant had made 
such a statement to her”). 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at 460 (stating that the number of phone calls had “little or no probative val-
ue”). 
120 See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 824 (“The existence of a financial arrangement made by 
defendant‟s uncle that directly benefitted defendant was certainly a circumstance that bore 
directly on whether the intimidation and bribery had been initiated or approved by defen-
dant.”). 
12
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the timing of threats coincided with the timing of the witness and de-
fendant meeting one another.121  This too is different from merely re-
ceiving phone calls after a crime.  Encarnacion was in prison and ac-
cused of a viscous crime, so it is more than reasonable that he would 
want to contact his girlfriend.  Arguably, if Encarnacion‟s side of the 
phone conversation were to be overheard and revealed that he was at-
tempting to induce Ofelia not to testify, then the sheer number of 
phone calls would most likely rise to the level of clear and convinc-
ing.  However, Nancy only testified to Ofelia‟s side of the conversa-
tion.122  More so, the trial court‟s findings do not indicate that the 
conversation between Ofelia and Encarnacion, to which Nancy testi-
fied to, even took place.123 
Finally, the court in Encarnacion found through Nancy‟s tes-
timony that the defendant, through his friends, threatened Ofelia.124  
However, Nancy‟s testimony was inconsistent throughout the hear-
ing.125  The statement, regarding the defendant‟s friends threatening 
the witness, ultimately comes “down to an in-court statement by 
[Nancy] about an out-of-court statement her daughter assertedly 
made about an out-of-court statement assertedly made by unidentified 
persons about an out-of-court statement assertedly made by the de-
fendant.”126  Allowing such statements into evidence is questiona-
ble.127 
The First Department, in furtherance of the Cotto decision, 
continued to lower the evidentiary standards required to meet the 
clear and convincing standard in a Sirois hearing.  The court in En-
carnacion sacrificed the confrontation protections that should have 
been afforded to Encarnacion through inconsistent and vague testi-
mony.  Trial courts in the First Department will now feel compelled 
to continue the trend of their higher courts and further lower the re-
 
121 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 398. 
122 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (McGuire, J., concurring). 
123 See id. (regarding Nancy‟s testimony between Ofelia and Encarnacion, the concurrence 
noted that “[t]he trial court‟s written opinion does not mention such a discussion,” nor does it 
even show that the conversation had occurred). 
124 Id. at 454 (majority opinion). 
125 See id. at 458 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that Nancy changed her testimony 
several times to friends, including saying that the defendant never threatened the witness, 
and that there was only one friend, not multiple, who made the threats). 
126 Id. at 458-59. 
127 See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59 (“Any conclusion that this is competent evi-
dence would be at least a controversial one.”). 
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quired evidentiary standard.  Although the evidentiary standard re-
quired in Sirois hearings remains expressly clear and convincing, the 
evidence required to meet that threshold has clearly diminished. 
V. DNA AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The defendant in this case, on appeal, objected to a witness 
being allowed to testify against him, using DNA tests that the witness 
had not personally conducted.128  The First Department declined re-
view of this issue because it was not specifically objected to on the 
same grounds raised on appeal.129  However, the court rejected it on 
the merits in an alternative holding.130 
To begin its analysis, the court in Encarnacion first deter-
mined whether DNA analysis was testimonial.131  The court noted 
that the Supreme Court of the United States defined testimonial as,    
“ „[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of es-
tablishing or proving some fact.‟ ”132  As per the rule set down by the 
Supreme Court, “if the statement is testimonial it cannot be used un-
less the declarant is unavailable at trial and the defendant has had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the same prior to trial.”133 
In comparing DNA test results to that of other laboratory re-
sults, the court in Encarnacion stated, “The admission in evidence of 
documents evincing the results of laboratory testing performed on 
narcotics recovered from a criminal defendant, without concomitantly 
producing those who performed the testing at trial, violates the Con-
frontation Clause.”134  Continuing its analogy to other types of lab re-
ports, the court noted that “reports evincing the results of fingerprint 
analysis performed on a defendant‟s fingerprints and those recovered 
at the scene of a crime, without producing the person who performed 
the analysis both invokes and violates the Confrontation Clause.”135  
 
128 Id. at 454 (majority opinion). 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 454-55. 
131 Id. at 455. 
132 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)) (alteration in original). 
133 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 455 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 
2527, 2531 (2009)). 
134 Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531). 
135 Id. (citing People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1033 (N.Y. 2008)). 
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The court differentiated DNA results from other lab test results by 
holding that DNA tests “contain non-identifying raw data . . . and 
thus, standing alone, and in the absence of expert opinion linking the 
results to the defendant, shed no light on the guilt of the accused.”136  
Therefore, the court held that a DNA analyst can testify regarding a 
DNA analysis in which he or she did not personally conduct.137 
A. Federal DNA 
The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington,138 established 
the initial guidelines for determining if testimony regarding DNA 
analysis by a person who did not personally perform the test violated 
the Confrontation Clause.139  In Crawford, the prosecution sought to 
use a tape-recorded statement of the defendant‟s wife without the de-
fendant‟s ability to cross-examine her.140  The Court, through looking 
at the history of the Confrontation Clause, found that the meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment supported two inferences.141  The first “prin-
cipal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”142  Second, the 
Framers believed that testimonial statements of a witness should not 
be used against a defendant unless there was a previous opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness.143  Next, the Court defined the term tes-
timony by applying its dictionary meaning, “ „[a] solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.‟ ”144  Therefore, the Court stated, “An accuser who makes a 
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense 
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
 
136 Id. at 456 (citing People v Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. 2009)). 
137 Id. 
138 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
139 Id. at 42.  A jury convicted the defendant of assault after a Washington State trial court 
allowed the prosecution to play for the jury a tape-recorded statement of the defendant‟s wife 
“to the police describing the stabbing, even though he had no opportunity for cross-
examination.”  Id. at 38. 
140 Id. at 42. 
141 Id. at 47-50. 
142 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
143 Id. at 53-54. 
144 Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)) (alteration in original). 
15
Fasano: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
944 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
not.”145  The Court in this part of its analysis defined the differences 
between statements that are testimonial and those that are non-
testimonial, by creating three classes of testimonial statements: 
(1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equiv-
alent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially; 
(2) extrajudicial statements . . . contained in forma-
lized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions; and 
(3) statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial.146 
Because the prosecution admitted the witness‟s testimonial statement 
against the defendant and gave no opportunity for cross-examination, 
the Court held that there was a violation of the defendant‟s Sixth 
Amendment rights.147 
The Supreme Court broadened the definition of testimonial 
when it decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts148 and held that cer-
tificates of analysis are testimonial.149  In Melendez-Diaz, a Massa-
chusetts trial court found the defendant guilty of drug related charges 
after admitting into evidence three certificates of analysis showing 
the substance in the defendant‟s possession had been cocaine.150  Pur-
suant to Massachusetts law, the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health was required to have the certificates notarized and sworn to by 
their analysts.151  The defendant objected to the introduction of the 
certificates, asserting that analysts were now required to testify in 
person after the ruling in Crawford.152  Both the appellate and su-
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 51-52 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
147 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
148 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
149 Id. at 2531-32. 
150 Id. at 2530-31. 
151 Id. at 2531. 
152 Id. 
16
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preme courts in Massachusetts rejected the defendant‟s claim that his 
Sixth Amendment right had been violated.153 
The Supreme Court held that the certificates of analysis were 
actually affidavits and thus, “were testimonial statements[] and the 
analysts were „witnesses‟ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Ab-
sent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and 
that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, peti-
tioner was entitled to „be confronted with‟ the analysts at trial.”154  In 
referring to the “core class of testimonial statements” the Court laid 
out in Crawford, the Court stated that the documents in this case 
caused little doubt that they fall within those classes and thus, “are 
quite plainly affidavits.”155 
After Encarnacion was decided in New York, the United 
States Supreme Court decided an important case regarding forensic 
analysts used to convict a defendant of aggravated DWI in Bullcom-
ing v. New Mexico.156  In Bullcoming, the defendant, after a DWI ar-
rest, had a forensic laboratory report used against him at trial, which 
stated that his blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit.157  The 
prosecution, instead of calling to the stand the person who signed the 
actual certification, called a different analyst who was familiar with 
the methods used by the laboratory, but had not actually taken part in 
the analysis used against the defendant.158 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine if the Confrontation Clause allowed the introduction of a foren-
sic laboratory report by an analyst who did not personally perform, 
observe, or certify the forensic laboratory test.159  The Court reite-
rated its holding from Crawford and stated that an out-of-court testi-
monial statement may not be used against a defendant at trial unless 
the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the 
witness and the witness is unavailable.160  The Court in its reasoning 
stated that the analyst‟s certification “reported more than a machine-
 
153 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
154 Id. at 2532 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54). 
155 Id. 
156 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 
157 Id. at 2709. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 2713. 
160 Id.  Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the New Mexico Supreme Court.  
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713. 
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generated number.”161  The analyst had, in fact, certified to receiving 
the defendant‟s blood sample with an unbroken seal, that he checked 
that the sample number and report number matched, and that he fol-
lowed proper protocol.162  From this, the Court stated, “These repre-
sentations, relating to past events and human actions not revealed in 
raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination.”163 
B. New York and DNA 
Prior to Melendez-Diaz, the New York Court of Appeals de-
cided the case People v. Meekins164 and held that DNA data generated 
by a private lab was not testimonial in nature.165  In Meekins, the de-
fendant was convicted by jury trial of sodomy and sexual abuse in the 
first-degree, along with robbery in the third-degree.166  The prosecu-
tion at trial introduced a private laboratory‟s DNA report of samples 
from the victim‟s rape kit.167 
 
161 Id. at 2714. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). 
165 Id. at 1034. 
166 Id. at 1024. 
167 Id.  To testify regarding this report, the prosecution called “two experts in DNA analy-
sis and forensic biology: Judith Floyd, employed by Gene Screen, the private laboratory, and 
Kyra Keblish, employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, neither of whom per-
sonally performed the actual testing.”  Id.  In the testimony of Floyd, she: 
[T]estified that she supervised the technicians who performed the testing 
in this case and performed a final review of their results[,] . . . [and she] 
explained that the lab issued a statement in its report indicating that a 
DNA profile originated from a male [that] was obtained from the sperm 
fraction of the oral swab in the rape kit and that the lab didn‟t do any 
comparisons of the results, but instead sent the report to the Medical Ex-
aminer‟s office for that task. 
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Next, Keblish testified that her office received the “raw data,” and from that she “in-
terpreted the graphical data by „wean[ing] out what peaks might not be DNA, because there 
are times that peaks will show up in the data that are not actually . . . DNA alleles or DNA 
peaks.‟ ”  Id. at 1025 (alteration in original).  Subsequently, Keblish matched the defendant‟s 
DNA to that of the sample.  Id.  She also testified “that the DNA report and related files were 
prepared in the regular course of business of the medical examiner‟s office and its contracted 
agencies.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The First Department held that the DNA 
report was actually a business record and “business records are by their nature . . . not testi-
monial”; therefore, the court affirmed the decision.  Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The New York Court of Appeals held that the DNA report 
was “not directly accusatory” and therefore, admissible.168  In its rea-
soning, the court stated that the DNA report contained “raw data 
[that] was in the form of non[-]identifying graphical information.”169  
Therefore, because the lab company “did not determine whether the 
data it collected matched [defendant] or any other suspect . . . and 
[did not] do any comparisons of the results,” any results from the 
DNA tests “shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the absence of 
an expert‟s opinion.”170  The court—in admitting that the analysts 
could have made errors in the testing procedures itself—noted that 
allowing subsequent reviewers, who are familiar with the laborato-
ry‟s protocol, the ability to verify another analyst‟s work under oath 
will allow a proper cross-examination to show that proper protocol 
was followed.171  Therefore, the court affirmed the decision and ruled 
that DNA reports were not testimonial.172 
Despite the Court‟s decision in Melendez-Diaz, the New York 
Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion in People v. Brown.173  
In Brown, the defendant raped a nine-year old girl and struck her on 
the head with a brick when she resisted.174  When the victim awoke, 
she was brought to the hospital and was given “a rape kit that was 
later sent to [Office of the Chief Medical Examiner].”175  Based on an 
analysis by a lab technician at the Office of the Chief Medical Ex-
aminer (“OCME”), it was determined that the profiles were a match 
occurring in one out of one trillion males.”176  The OCME witness 
 
168 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1035. 
169 Id. at 1034. 
170 Id. at 1035. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. (affirming the decision of the trial court). 
173 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931. 
174 Id. at 928. 
175 Id.  The rape kit was not processed until “almost nine-years after the crime,” due to a 
backlog.  Id. at 928.  The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) “sent the rape 
kit, along with 225 others, to Bode Technology, one of at least three of its subcontracting 
laboratories, for testing.”  Id. at 928-29.  The lab produced a “DNA report containing ma-
chine-generated raw data, graphs and charts” and “isolated a male DNA specimen from the 
rape kit.”  Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 929.  Maryland police during a routine search of a DNA 
data bank “registered a cold hit, linking defendant‟s DNA to the profile found in the victim‟s 
rape kit.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  At the OCME, “a forensic biolo-
gist/criminalist . . . compared defendant‟s DNA characteristics to the specimen from the vic-
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testified that the DNA report she received from laboratory: 
[C]onsisted merely of raw data and contained no con-
clusions other than noting that there was a male spe-
cimen found in the victim‟s rape kit[,] . . . [and] [s]he 
stated that she drew her own scientific conclusions 
from analyzing the data and defendant‟s DNA profile  
. . . .  The court then admitted the report into evi-
dence.177 
The New York Court of Appeals held that the DNA report 
from the laboratory “consisted of merely machine-generated graphs, 
charges and numerical data,” was not testimonial, and did not contain 
conclusions or other interpretations.178 
The court distinguished this case from Melendez-Diaz and 
held that the report from the private laboratory was not testimonial.  
In Brown, it was the forensic biologist on the stand, who analyzed 
and came to her own conclusions from the data from the private la-
boratory‟s report that linked the defendant to the crime, unlike in Me-
lendez-Diaz, where the certificates of analysis showed the substance 
in the defendant‟s possession was cocaine.179  Therefore, the defen-
dant could directly cross-examine the person linking him to the 
crime.180 
The court then discussed this case under several noted factors 
used in a Crawford analysis: 
(1) whether the agency that produced the record is in-
dependent of law enforcement; (2) whether it reflects 
objective facts at the time of their recording; (3) 
whether the report has been biased in favor of law en-
forcement; and (4) whether the report accuses the de-
fendant by directly linking him or her to the crime.181 
 
177 Id. at 130. 
178 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The New York Court of 
Appeals previously held in People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008), that “finger-
print analysis was „testimonial‟ because it was prepared by police solely to be entered at the 
subsequent trial against the defendant, and it was therefore offered upon a purely accusatory 
basis to establish defendant‟s identity at trial.”  Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931 (citing Rawlins, 
884 N.E.2d at 1033). 
179 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. 
180 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931. 
181 Id. (citing People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843, 845-46 (N.Y. 2008)). 
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Regarding the first factor, the court noted that the private laboratory 
was independent of both the police department and District Attor-
ney‟s Office.182  Second, there was no subjective analysis because the 
report did not contain any apparent conclusions, interpretations, or 
even comparisons.183  Third, the report was produced prior to the de-
fendant being a suspect and thus there could not have been a bias in 
favor of law-enforcement.184  Regarding the final guideline, the court 
held that unlike the analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz, it was the tes-
tifying analyst who actually linked the defendant to the crime.185 
V. ANALYSIS 
After Meekins and Brown, the First Department‟s decision in 
Encarnacion is unsurprising.186  The surprising aspect of the ruling is 
that the court decided to rule on this case while Bullcoming was 
pending before the Supreme Court.187  Many of the arguments dis-
cussed in Encarnacion were brought up in Bullcoming, and thus, the 
First Department now seems in dispute with the Supreme Court.188 
The court in Encarnacion in holding that DNA reports are not 
testimonial, relied on Brown and Meekins, in which the New York 
Court of Appeals held that DNA reports are not accusatory because 
they only contain raw data which is non-identifying in the form of a 
DNA profile.189  Consequently, the DNA reports “standing alone 
shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the absence of an expert‟s 
opinion that the results genetically match a known sample.”190  Simi-
larly, in Bullcoming, the prosecution argued that the witness‟s affir-
 
182 Id. at 932. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 931.  The court also held that the private laboratory‟s documents 
were admissible under New York‟s business records rule.  Id. at 932. 
186 Compare id. at 931-32 (holding that a DNA analyst‟s testimony, regarding a DNA test 
the analyst did not personally perform, was not testimonial), with Encarnacion, 926 
N.Y.S.2d at 456 (holding the testimony of a DNA analyst who testified regarding DNA tests 
she both did and did not personally conduct was admissible). 
187 Compare Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (decided June 23, 2011), with Bullcom-
ing, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (decided June 23, 2011 with arguments beginning on March 2, 2011). 
188 Compare Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (holding that non-identifying raw data is 
not accusatory), with Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (holding that certifying to a machine-
generated number is testimonial). 
189 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
190 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1035. 
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mations were not accusatory.191  In contradiction to Brown and Mee-
kins, the Court in Bullcoming, regarding raw data, stated that the 
technician who certifies a test of machine-generated numbers, does 
more than merely certify as to the numbers, the technician also certi-
fies that evidentiary procedures and proper protocol were followed.192  
Therefore, the human actions taken in the testing procedure are also 
shown by a DNA report.193  Accordingly, this shows that the raw data 
arguments in Bullcoming are too similar to the arguments in Encar-
nacion to be simply ignored. 
The DNA reports from Encarnacion are testimonial by Su-
preme Court standards even without citing to Bullcoming.  First, 
DNA reports fit into the categorical definition of testimonial set out 
by Crawford, which says, “statements that were made under circums-
tances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” are tes-
timonial.194  The technician in Encarnacion worked at the OCME, 
knew that the items came from a crime scene, and if not told about 
the exact crime could easily deduce that it was a serious crime.195  
Similar to the facts in Crawford, the DNA technicians were em-
ployees of a government agency that supported the police, though 
they were not police.196  Thus, the historical argument from Crawford 
which states, “The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte 
testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it 
was elicited by „neutral‟ government officers,”197 would be violated. 
The witness from OCME testified regarding results she had 
not personally conducted or supervised;198 therefore, she should not 
have been allowed to testify at trial.199  The New York court in Mee-
 
191 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id. at 2714. 
193 Id. 
194 Cf. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52) (noting that 
the DNA reports used in Crawford, that were collected from the crime scene by police and 
sent to a lab for analysis, are similar to Melendez-Diaz, where officers sent what they be-
lieved to be drugs to a lab after a drug arrest). 
195 See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (describing how the items sent to the lab from 
the crime scene contained not only bloody clothing, but also bloody knives; therefore, it 
would be a fair assumption to think that a crime was committed). 
196 Id. 
197 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66. 
198 Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
199 See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“It would be a differ-
22
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kins is able to find support for allowing a witness who did not perso-
nally conduct the laboratory test through Justice Sotomayor‟s concur-
ring opinion in Bullcoming,200 however, the Encarnacion and Brown 
decisions do not.201  Agreeably, the testifying lab technician from En-
carnacion is fully aware of the procedures her fellow lab employee 
conducted; however, “the [Confrontation] Clause does not tolerate 
dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that 
questioning one witness about another‟s testimonial statements pro-
vides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”202 
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illi-
nois203 will finally resolve the DNA issue.204  Based on the decision 
in Bullcoming, it seems logical that the Court when deciding Wil-
liams will hold that DNA reports are testimonial and cannot be ad-
mitted into evidence without confrontation.205  Even federal circuits 
that once held DNA test results to be non-testimonial have changed 
course after Bullcoming noting that DNA results are at times imper-
fect.206  Furthermore, regarding forensic testing, the Supreme Court 
has noted that “human error can occur at each step”207 and 
“[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic analy-
 
ent case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test testified 
about the results or a report about such results.”). 
200 Compare Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the 
analyst in Bullcoming had no direct involvement in the test and thus was unable to testify, 
but, “It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst con-
ducting a test testified about the results or a report”), with Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034 (not-
ing that the analyst testifying was the supervisor of the analyst who conducted the test). 
201 Compare Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 929 (stating that where the analyst testified regard-
ing the DNA results did not even work at the lab which did the testing), with Encarnacion, 
926 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (stating that the analyst who testified regarding DNA results had not 
personally conducted all the tests of the results in which she was testifying). 
202 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716. 
203 131 S. Ct. 2974 (2011). 
204 The question on petition for certiorari in Williams is whether Illinois‟s law of allowing 
a DNA analyst to testify, regarding a DNA test he or she did not personally perform, violates 
the Confrontation Clause.  SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 15, 2011, 8:19 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/williams-v-illinois/?wpmp_switcher=desktop. 
205 See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst‟s tes-
timonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amend-
ment . . . .”). 
206 Compare United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[R]aw data 
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sis.”208  Therefore, it is more than likely that the Supreme Court will 
continue its trend and ensure that defendants are protected with con-
frontation against reports that are made through a process of imper-
fect human procedures.  The Court will do so by ruling that a lab 
technician who performed the DNA test must testify, or at the mini-
mum a direct supervisor at trial.  The question of how many techni-
cians may a supervisor have under his or her control and still be able 
to testify at trial may possibly still be left open after Williams. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the First Department in Encarnacion made two 
highly controversial holdings on issues that did not need to be de-
cided.209  First, the court‟s holding continues the decline of what 
amounts to clear and convincing in New York.  Second, the court‟s 
holding now seems to be in contradiction with the Supreme Court‟s 
decision in Bullcoming.  When the Supreme Court decides the DNA 
issue in Williams, it will most likely overrule the decision in Encar-
nacion. 
 




208 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 
209 See Encarnacion, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 457 (McGuire, J., concurring) (stating that there 
was no need to resolve the issue). 
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